Somalia President Building Wrong Army

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud effectively disbanded Somali National Army(SNA) when he embraced Macawislaayclan militia. Intentionally or unintentionally, the outcome was the same. 

 Mohamud compounded the problem by allowing Egypt and United Arab Emirates(UAE) to recruit young men between the ages of 18 and 26 years old in Somalia. Egypt’s objectives are clear. UAE goals are more mercurial. 

 The two countries are in a full partnership troop buildup in Somalia. Egypt and UAE complement each other in the endeavor. Egypt is taking the lead on the technical aspect of the project while UAE, a small but wealthy nation, has been covering most of the finances.

The collaborative troop buildup by Egypt and UAE is not in support of SNA. It is intended to be a private army ready to deploy as the two countries see fit. 

 One thing is very clear despite the plausible deniability involving some of the political intentions. Egypt has recruited Mohamud as part of the coalition against Ethiopia. The two countries have been at loggerheads over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance(GERD) on the Nile River. 

 Egypt considers the Nile River water flow an existential threat. The Nile River is the primary source of irrigation for a country with over 100 million people.

 Egypt and Ethiopia have sparred over the issue in the past. Egypt always had military options ready.

 In 1978, Mengistu Haile Mariam proposed building a series of dams on the Nile. Egypt’s President at the time Anwar Sadadminced no words. “We are not going to wait to die of thirst in Egypt. We’ll go to Ethiopia and die there.” 

 More recently, Egypt drew up plans to dispatch American-supplied F-16 to destroy the dam. This plan was scuttled after technical challenges delayed GERD construction.

 It is a dispute with that background that Mohamud walked right into when he visited Cairo in July of 2022. Mohamud met with the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the two discussed the topic.

 El-Sisi was very explicit about the scope of the discussion in the concluding press release. He announced Somalia sided with Egypt on the Nile River dispute with Ethiopia.

 Mohamud tried to deny the agreement through the press secretary. But eventually, he backtracked from the denial campaign.

 The admission of the agreement has been the only event that caused someone in Villa Somalia to be fired. It was one of the last times we heard from spokesman Abdikarim Ali Kaar in his feudal effort to mimic the White House daily briefing. Kaarsimply could not survive the public fiasco fell out.

 

 Sources among Mohamud’s delegation to the Cairo trip confirmed two other crucial details. The first was to create an Egyptian base in Somalia for the primary reason of applying military pressure on Ethiopia. The second was that the price tag for the base was roughly estimated at $60M. Mohamud received part of this money quickly.

 Mohamud and El-Sisi met twice since. The last meeting was at the sideline of the Arab League gathering in Algeria. Among the discussion was compensation for the death of Somali recruits who were killed by Egyptian trainers in Mogadishu.

 The deceased recruits were part of Egypt and UAE total troop buildup of up to 8,000 men in Somalia. The first 3,000 regiments had been recruited of which an estimated 1,200 had been airlifted to Egypt for advanced training.

 While Egypt’s objectives are crystal clear, UAE ones are less clairvoyant. The assessment that Somalia is within the sphere of influence of UAE certainly has some merits.

 UAE had recruited mercenary troops from other countries rife with conflict such as Libya and Sudan to support its involvement in Yemen. Conflict and economic desperation of the local population make countries such as Libya, Somalia, and Sudan fertile ground to recruit private armies that destabilize other nations.

 UAE had expressed some macroeconomics in Somalia. It is imperative to understand this is not in the context of normal trade between two nations.

 UAE economic pursuit in Somalia is one-sided with insignificant expenses to bribe corrupt officials. The focus thus far has been to control key infrastructure including ports.

 For example, DP World, a cargo logistics company owned and operated by UAE had been in acquisition assets mode in Somalia. A desire to expand those economic interests and associated strategic interests is a strong motivation for UAE. 

 Egypt and UAE latest troop buildup in Somalia makes the Nile River water dispute a looming flashpoint of crisis in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Mohamud seems to be oblivious to this potential conflagration. 

 Ethiopia recently defeated Tigray People’s Liberation Front(TPLF) and concluded two years of civil war. Ethiopia now has military bandwidth.  

 There are two possible approaches for Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed towards Somalia. The path he chooses will influence the region’s direction.

 Abiy can deploy military bandwidth freed up by the cessation of hostilities with TPLF to destabilize Somalia further. Military deployment to destabilize Somalia is an old Ethiopia habit.

 The Ethiopia of Mengistu Haile Mariam and Melez Zewaniresorted to hostile confrontation with Somalia. The conduct of Ethiopia shackled its own potential and ran Somalia to the ground.  

 Every time Mingistu tried to invade Somalia, SNA dug deeper and repelled Ethiopia. When Melez decided to march tanks to Mogadishu with the full back of America, Somalis came together and put-up fierce resistance forcing Ethiopia to retreat. Therefore, deploying military bandwidth to Somalia failed before and there is no reason to expect it will work in the future. 

 The other approach is rooted in the tripartite agreement in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Mohamud is an unlikely partner for this.

 However, the lack of counterpart partnership is insufficient to abandon the idea. There are many able partners for tripartite to flourish in Somalia.

 Supporters of tripartite are in parliament, among regional leaders, and in Somali civic society. A collaboration with these segments can catapult regional stability.

 Mustafe Mohamed Omar(Cagjar) the leader of the Somali region in Ethiopia can be a key facilitator in this endeavor. Cagjar can do this despite his poor critique of Somali voices who oppose Mohamud’s disastrous approach of clan mobilization which practically disbanded SNA. 

 Abiy should also endorse the adjournment of ATMIS presence in Somalia. He could leverage his relationship with William Ruto and persuade Kenya to withdraw from Jubbaland. Less foreign troops will ultimately expose Egypt and UAE activities and drive them out of Somalia as well. 

 Mohamud is viewing all these dynamics through his standard prism of collecting quick cash for personnel enrichment. Mohamud promises money to political acquaintances to buy loyalty. He is often overwhelmed with verbal debt.

 Maintaining this political Ponzi scheme is exhausting. It is one of the main reasons for frequent overseas trips.

 Mohamud’s political north of searching for cash to finance a political Ponzi scheme is letting him build the wrong type of army in Somalia. He is destined to leave Somalia which is less secure than the one he founded on May 15, 2002.

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Author is a Technology Entrepreneur and long-time civic leader. He tweets @fuguni. Follow him for more in-depth analysis.